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Abstract
Models of discourse and narration elaborated within the classical compositional framework have
been characterized as bottom-up models, according to which discourse analysis proceeds incre-
mentally, from phrase and sentence local meaning to discourse global meaning. In this paper we
will argue against these models. Assuming as a case study the issue of discourse coherence, we
suggest that the assessment of coherence is a top-down process, in which the construction of a
situational interpretation at the global meaning level guides local meaning analysis. In support
of our hypothesis, we explore the role of executive functions (brain functions involved in planning
and organization of goal-oriented behaviors) in coherence’s establishment, discussing the results
of several studies on narrative abilities of patients with brain injuries. We suggest that, com-
pared to other models of discourse processing focused on comprehension, our model is a viable
candidate for an integrated account of discourse comprehension and production.
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1 Introduction
In spite of the criticisms to generative grammar in recent years, Chomsky’s concept of
language continues to be the standard model in cognitive science. At the base of this model
are the assumptions that the structure of the internal constituents of the sentence represents
the core of language and that, consequently, the general device at the basis of language is a
module specialized in the analysis of the syntactic structure of the sentence. But what does
this model tell us about human narrative abilities? Even if Chomsky does not address the
issue explicitly, scholars who are inspired by universal grammar and who are interested in the
study of narrative processing maintain that the building of the coherent flow of discourse (the
basis of any narrative abilities) must be interpreted in terms of syntactic parser functioning.
In their view, in fact, the principles that govern the sequence of sentences in the construction
of the discourse are specified in some constituents of the sentence’s structure. According
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to this perspective, information processing that underlies narrative abilities has a strong
“bottom-up” character: the global level of discourse is gained starting from the analysis of the
single sentences actually said, through a sequential process of accumulation of information
(e.g., [36]).
In this paper we propose an alternative model of language and narrative abilities. Against
the Chomskian idea of the primacy of the sentence, we propose that the ability to process
discourse takes priority over the ability to process sentences. Such a proposal, which we
characterize as a “top-down” hypothesis, implies the adhesion to two aspects particularly
relevant to the analysis of narrative abilities. First, sentence comprehension is driven by
a prior comprehension of the coherence of the flow of discourse: the understanding of the
narrative flow has logical and temporal priority on the comprehension of sentences. Second,
discourse comprehension implies the involvement of cognitive devices other than those
implicated in the analysis of the constituents structures of sentences. Contrary to the devices
specialized in the analysis of the syntactic structure, indeed, the processing systems involved
in the analysis of discourse have a specific character of projection. While the bottom-up
model is firmly anchored to the processing of what the speaker effectively says in a given
moment, the top-down model we are proposing is largely fueled by information on what she
has already said (projections into the past) and on what she is going to say (projections into
the future). What kind of devices can analyze this kind of information?
From a general point of view, our idea is that the projection devices responsible for the
construction of discourse are similar to those involved in the processes of navigation. The
relationship between narrative abilities and spatial navigation is a good metaphor empirically
grounded. Experimental data corroborate, indeed, the idea that the devices involved in
the analysis of discourse (ones that allow us to “keep the route” to reach the goal we have
in mind) are closely related to systems that allow us to navigate through space and time
[14, 18, 19, 20]. In this paper we will analyze only a limited aspect of the relationship between
narrative abilities and navigation: the role played by a specific device of projection (the
executive functions of action planning) in the building of the “global coherence” of discourse.
In general, the projection devices can ensure a strong attachment of the expressions uttered in
the flow of speech to the context. For this reason, the model of the navigation can explain the
link between linguistic expressions and the extralinguistic context [14, 18, 20]. In this paper
we focus the attention on the theme of global coherence. This theme leads us to consider
the link between sentences in the intralinguistic context. The hypothesis that underlies our
work is that human narrative abilities cannot be explained only in terms of local coherence
(cohesion). In spite of the key role assigned to the syntactic constituents by the standard
model, indeed, some properties of discourse may be explained only by referring to the global
coherence. As we’ll see, in this regard a key role is played by executive functions.
This paper is divided into three parts: in the first (pars destruens) we discuss the nature
and limits of the bottom-up model of language and discourse according to which the phrase
has a logic and temporal priority on the discourse. In the second part (pars construens)
we present a top-down model of language and narrative abilities in which the discourse
has a logical and temporal priority on the sentence. In the third part, referring to the
literature on narrative pathologies, we present empirical evidence for our model, analyzing
the processing systems that regulate the coherence of the flow of discourse. We have to
specify that, although discourse and narrative are two phenomena not completely equivalent,
in this paper we discuss them together as we examine coherence that is a fundamental
property that is common to both.
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2 The primacy of the sentence and the bottom-up model of discourse
The idea of language that emerges from the perspective of classical modularity is reflected in
the dedication that Fodor [23] addressed to Garrett:
One day—it must have been five years or so ago—my friend, colleague, and sometime
coauthor Merrill Garrett made what seems to me to be the deepest remark that I
have yet heard about the psychological mechanisms that mediate the perception of
language. “What you have to remember about parsing,” Merrill said, “is that basically
it’s a reflex.” This work is, in effect, a sustained meditation on Merrill’s insight, and
it is gratefully dedicated to him.
This idea that language is a reflex, actually means it is a way of treating language as a
module. The similarity between modules (“stupid” systems that operate in an automatic
and mandatory way) and reflexes depends on an evolutionarily significant reason: the
processing speed [53, 46]. The stupidity of the modules is an adaptive strategy through
which the cognitive system can process large amounts of information quickly. The amount
of information that language can transmit is amazing. Without a fast processing system,
human communication probably would be doomed to failure. But the speed comes at a cost.
The devices specialized for the rapid processing of language must have an automatic and
mandatory character; they have to be able to focus exclusively on certain aspects of the
stimulus. Devices of this kind must have, in other words, specific bottom-up properties. The
reference to bottom-up devices has important consequences for the understanding of the
nature of human communication.
In the standard version of cognitive science, communication is interpreted in terms of the
code model [48], a model that Fodor [22, p. 106] considers “not just natural but inevitable”.
According to this model, “we have communicated when you have told me what you have
in mind and I have understood what you have told me” [22, p. 109]. The fact that verbal
communication relates to the sharing of thoughts between speaker and listener raises a
number of interesting questions. The most important one for our current purposes concerns
what makes possible the transformation of thought into language. How is it possible that a
mental state (the nature of which is abstract and conceptual) can be coded in a physical
structure (a succession of sounds, in the case of verbal language) and, through this step, can
be communicated to the receiver? How is it possible, in other words, that the structure of
sounds is able to respect the structure of mental states?
The move taken by the proponents of the standard model to answer this problem is
to question the structural isomorphism between language and thought. The argument of
Fodor [22, 24] is clear: language can express thought because it reflects the basic structure
of thought, the “logical form.” The point is particularly relevant for our purposes. The
primacy assigned to the phrase by the advocates of standard conception depends heavily on
the propositional nature of thoughts. The thesis of the isomorphism between the constituents
structure of thoughts and the syntactic structure of sentences that express them has a direct
impact on the understanding of human communication. According to Fodor (as well as
Chomsky and all the authors who adopt the standard model), the analysis of language is
entirely governed by a device specifically used in the processing of the logical form (syntax,
basically) of the utterances. From such a perspective, contextual information it is not only
irrelevant but also harmful: everything needed to understand what the speaker said is
encoded in the utterance.
The thesis of the isomorphism between language and thought fits perfectly with the idea
that the processing devices have a bottom-up character. At the base of this character is the
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mechanistic nature of the language module that is considered a self-sufficient processing system.
Each time the linguistic device detects the appropriate stimulus in the environment (utterances
that exhibit a logical form), the comprehension follows as a automatic and mandatory
consequence of the processing of the stimulus. This mechanistic idea of comprehension is
highlighted by Fodor, who argues that “one cannot avoid hearing a phrase that has been
said (in a known language) as a phrase that has been said” [23, p. 91]. In this paper, we do
not care to discuss this issue. What interests us here is to note that, in the standard version,
the analysis of the logical form of the sentences is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
comprehension of the content expressed by those sentences and that such analysis implies a
specific processing device wired on the syntactic properties of the sentences.
Bottom-up models in cognitive science have always been considered, because of the
emphasis on the mechanical and material aspects of the information processes, the trump
card in the debate on the naturalization of the mind [23]1. In spite of these considerations,
our idea is that the bottom-up models based on the primacy of the phrase are founded
on a highly abstract concept of language. Indeed, the processing device, focalized on the
syntactic aspects of the phrases, has to operate independently from any background noise:
so to speak, it must analyze the shape of the proposition in its “purity.” The models that
explain human narrative capabilities using the theoretical paradigm of the primacy of the
phrase have enormous explanatory difficulties, as we shall see in the next section. These
difficulties will lead us to change the interpretative model.
3 Processing coherence: how local and global processes are
intertwined
According to standard compositional theories, sentences encode meaning by the means of
a context-free rule-based combination of lexical–semantic features of the words within a
sentence. This step of the comprehension process is considered necessary, and it corresponds
to the level of sentences’ truth conditions. Such a thesis is a “literal meaning thesis” and is the
basis of all traditional semantic theories. According to the literalist thesis, the contribution
of world knowledge to the truth conditions is limited to cases of indexicality and ambiguity;
this means that the role of the context of utterance should be traceable to syntactic elements
in the logical form of sentences. Currently, many scholars interested in language functioning
recognize that processes of the type just described are not enough to account fully for
language comprehension and production. They seem to agree that, at a certain point, context
is taken into account. The disagreement is about when, exactly, this happens.
Here it might be useful to draw a distinction between a two-step model of linguistic
comprehension and a one-step model. Classical theories of meaning are two-step models,
according to which contextual information is considered only after establishing phrase or
sentence local meaning. On the basis of a one-step model, contextual information may be
used in a more top-down fashion, such that the local contribution of individual words or
sentences is a function of the construction of a situational interpretation at the global meaning
level. In this article we argue against two-step interpretations of language comprehension,
1 It must be said that there have been multiple attempts to devise Chomsky-style narrative grammars
(e.g., [39, 38]) and that these operate top-down. Nevertheless, although they represent a step forward
compared with Chomskian perspective, our idea is that such attempts are ineffective to account for the
global coherence of the discourse since it is a pragmatic property that cannot be explained in terms of
universal grammar.
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and we propose a one-step model according to which the wider discourse context has an
immediate effect on the unfolding linguistic information.
From this perspective, our criticism extends also to some models of discourse elaborated
in the field of discourse analysis. Even if from the 1980s onward the explicit goal of people
working in that field has been going beyond the sentence, our specific charge here is that
models of discourse elaborated within the classical compositional framework (e.g., [36]) are
still characterized by the idea that sentence analysis has priority over discourse analysis. The
model proposed by Kintsch and van Dijk [36], for example, is a bottom-up model, which
is centered on the role of mental propositions expressed by predicate-argument structure.
According to this model, the structure of a text or a discourse (“macrostructure”) can be
formally derived from the structure of the relations between sentences (which form the
“microstructure”) by the means of the application of some general rules. This model, then,
fits into a two-step perspective of the interpretation process as discourse meaning is inferred
only once sentences’ analysis is completed. Such a model has been very popular among
linguists during the last thirty years, and it still represents the dominant view on discourse
processes. In spite of this, we argue that this model, as well as other two-step models, can be
seriously undermined by challenging two key psycholinguistic assumptions that lie behind it.
First, the model assumes the incremental nature of the interpretative process, which
means that the processing of coherence is based on a word-by-word analysis and integration.
This is the very essence of two-step models because incrementality is consistent with the
idea that local meanings are built up from the meanings of individual words, which in
turn is consistent with compositionality principle. Second, the orthodox view of language
comprehension is that the processes involved are fully completed, namely, that semantic
information for each word is fully retrieved during the incremental process. For example,
Just and Carpenter [35] state: “readers interpret a word while they are fixating it, and they
continue to fixate it until they have processed it as far as they can” (p. 30).
From these two assumptions follows the classical compositional view that local coherence
is established prior to global coherence and that a thorough check at the local level is part of
the normal process of coherence establishment. In the current paper, these two assumptions
are called into question, presenting arguments in favor of alternative claims that (1) discourse
processing is driven by global processes oriented to topic maintenance as opposed to the
maintenance between utterances, (2) the extent to which an item is analyzed at a local
semantic level is a function of the general fit of that item to the discourse context. The
higher the global fit of the item, the lower the accuracy of the semantic processing of that
item is. In order to test these hypotheses, we focus on anomaly detection. In particular,
the case study is the survivor effect observed in the way certain discourses are interpreted
naturally by human subject, and described below.
4 Towards a top-down model of discourse
The idea that discourse processing is based on the construction of a coherent mental
representation of what is in the discourse is a widely accepted view. In particular, the aim of
comprehension and production processes is the construction of an integrated representation
that reaches a “coherence threshold.” The question is how that threshold is reached. As
mentioned, according to the standard compositional view, discourse processing proceeds in a
bottom-up fashion, constructing a complete representation based on a thorough check of each
sentence. From this perspective local meaning is established prior to global meaning [36, 44].
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Accordingly, McKoon and Ratcliff [43] have proposed the minimalist hypothesis that
claims people only try to establish global coherence when there is a break in meaning at
the local level. Alternatively, discourse-level information may be used in a more top-down
fashion, such that the local contribution of individual words or sentences is a function of the
construction of situational interpretation at the global meaning level. In this latter view,
partial or incomplete semantic analysis at the sentence level would often be sufficient to fulfill
the comprehender’s coherence need. Looking for discourse coherence, listeners would activate
global instead of local processes, namely processes that are oriented to the maintenance of
global coherence (topic maintenance), as opposed to local coherence (maintenance between
utterances). A number of studies have provided evidence supporting this latter view.
For the purposes of this paper, studies concerning a well-documented effect during
language processing, the “survivor effect,” are particularly relevant. In the following example,
subjects were asked to write solutions to a version of the subsequent problem (adapted from
[6]:
A tourist flight crashes in the Pyrenees, and wreckage is strewn equally in France and
Spain. Where should the survivors be buried?
Results show that only 66% of the subjects noted that survivors are not the sorts of
things that should be buried. Even more striking, when the term “survivors” was replaced by
the phrase “surviving dead,” only 23% of the subjects noted any anomaly. The extremely low
detection rate suggests that local semantics of the phrase “surviving dead” is not computed
prior to its incorporation into the more global representation of the text. If it were, the
anomaly should be noted at that initial stage. It would seem that subjects understand the
story by developing a global, situational interpretation of the discourse. To the extent that
the coherence at the global level can be maintained (for example, “dead” is consistent with
the global plane-crash situation), local problems are ignored and perhaps not even computed.
To support this conclusion further, it should be noted that if the critical expression
(“surviving dead”) is embedded within an incongruent context, for example a “bicycle
accident,” then subjects’ reaction to the anomalous phrase is completely different. This
time they will more easily notice the anomaly, and changing the scenario can manipulate
the relevance of critical phrases. This is extremely significant as it shows that the extent
of semantic analysis the critical item receives is a function of the general fit of the item to
expectations based on context. If the global fit of phrases in the context is high, then more
detailed, effortful, time-consuming analysis may not take place. In contrast to strict bottom-
up, incremental interpretation, these findings are consistent with the idea that coherence’s
establishment is a top-down process guided by listener’s expectations. Once the system has a
satisfactory level of information supporting coherence, further analysis might not take place.
That said, the question we need to address now is how exactly the process of coherence’s
evaluation works at cognitive architectural level. Which are the principles and the actual
cognitive components that guide the top-down assessment of coherence?
We mentioned that cognitive processes of projection in space and time (i.e., navigational
abilities) may have a crucial role in the processing of coherence. In the current paper we
will not go into detail about the general navigational framework of communication (for an
extended presentation of the model (see [14, 21, 20]). Here we will rather focus on a very
specific aspect of navigational abilities, i.e., the contribution of executive functions. Before
turning to this, we should note that our approach fits into a cognitive pragmatic conceptual
framework and thus shares some general aspects of other pragmatic accounts of language,
in particular Relevance Theory (RT;[50]. However, as we discuss elsewhere [14], several
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characteristics distinguish our model from RT’s model. For our current purposes, it will be
sufficient to contrast a “theory of mind” account of pragmatics with a “navigation” framework
on the basis of two related claims. First, we claim that a navigational model provides a
richer notion of context compared to RT’s model. According to a navigational model, the
interpretative process is guided not only by the attribution of mental states to interlocutors,
but also by the exploration of spatial and temporal perspectives that, even if activated by
the current circumstances, represent alterative states of the actual situation. In this view,
context is defined by the concurrent functions of grounding and projection [21], which allows
the individual to take into account the extra-linguistic world by projecting himself toward
spatial and temporal alternative scenarios.
The second relevant aspect concerns more closely the very notion of coherence. We would
like to point out that most of the models of discourse processing discussed so far emphasize
the comprehension side of the interpretative process. Classical compositional models are
focused on mental processes of understanding what an interlocutor or a text expresses,
providing a bottom-up analysis of such a process. However, RT’s model acknowledges the
role of top-down processes, but it also seems to be limited to the analysis of linguistic
comprehension. Indeed, the notion of relevance, which is the key notion of RT’s model, is
much more concerned with comprehension than production. In the last part of this paper we
will argue that this aspect may be considered a “side effect” of RT’s model and that a more
powerful unifying model, in which comprehension and production are placed side by side, can
be reached by elaborating on the notion of coherence. As we will see, the one-step model we
are proposing, according to which coherence is processed in a top-down fashion and guided
by the role of executive functions, presents itself as a viable candidate for a unifying model
of discourse processing.
5 It is not only a matter of relevance: coherence intuitions
Our idea is that, in order to propose a unified model of discourse processing, it is necessary
to analyze not only the processes of interpretation, but also the processes of production. We
discuss this idea through the analysis of the cognitive devices involved in the establishment
of coherence. To clarify the issue, we begin by highlighting once again the aspects that
distinguish our model of pragmatics from that of RT’s.
According to the model proposed by Sperber and Wilson, verbal communication’s burden
falls mainly on the listener, who engages to reconstruct, through inferential chains, the
speaker’s intention. In fact, the main reason why RT’s is primarily a model of comprehension
lies in the adoption of Grice’s assumption according to which, in the communication processes,
the starting point is the intention of the speaker [30]. From this point of view, the speaker’s
intention is a phenomenon already given and each verbal cue introduced by the speaker it
is necessary for the listener in order to reconstruct that intention. Now, while Grice [31]
through the formulation of conversational maxims, tried to give an account of the processes
involved in language production, in RT’s model an explanation of this kind lacks.
Sperber and Wilson [49] argue that the main purpose of RT’s model, and more generally
of pragmatics, is to clarify the nature of the processes and the skills that allow the listener to
reconstruct inferentially the intention of the speaker on the basis of the sentence’s meaning.
In fact, they characterize pragmatics as inferential comprehension oriented to relevance
detection. As Wilson [55] points out, “the main aim of relevance theory in the domain of
verbal communication is to explain how utterances are understood” (p. 58). At a general
level, the inferential comprehension is made possible by a specific cognitive system, the theory
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of mind (ToM) module, that underlies the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs,
intentions, and feelings to others and to explain and to predict the actions that derive from
them (e.g., [5, 37]). What is important to note is that relevance theorists see pragmatics as
a specific component, a relevance-based comprehension module, of the ToM module with its
own proprietary concepts and procedures distinct from general ToM module [11, 49]. This
means that the relevance principle characterizes, from a pragmatic point of view, the essence
of pragmatics.
RT’s model (heavily focused on the aspects of language comprehension and on principle
of relevance) evidently represents an overly limited view of pragmatics and, consequently, a
limited view of human communication [1]. Relevance, indeed, is not the only principle that
governs communication. As highlighted, for example by Giora [27, 28], “speakers and hearers
are not constrained only by the search for relevance. In addition, coherence considerations
constrain communication and play a major role in discourse structuring and understanding”
[27, p. 31]. To see how this is possible, one must analyze some verbal expressions and
discuss them in reference to the notions of RT’s model. Though such an analysis may
appear extremely technical, it is important for the purposes of our argument to show that 1)
relevance is not the only property of communication and 2) discourse coherence has a key
role in pragmatic processes.
According to Sperber and Wilson [50, 56] an input (e.g., an utterance or a memory) is
relevant to an individual when it connects with background information she has available to
yield conclusions that matter to her. More in detail, an input is relevant to an individual
when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a positive cognitive effect,
that is to say, a worthwhile difference to the individual’s representation of the world (e.g.,
a true conclusion). The most important type of cognitive effect achieved by processing an
input in a context is a contextual implication, a conclusion deducible from the input and the
context together. Besides the cognitive effect, relevance of an input relies also on processing
effort. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort, the lower the relevance of
an input to an individual in a given time. Thus, the relevance of an input for an individual
at a given time is a positive function of the cognitive benefits that he would gain from
processing it and a negative function of the processing effort needed to achieve these benefits.
Giora points out that there are cases where the verbal productions are inappropriate from a
pragmatic point of view because they lack coherence, but they are relevant (in Sperber and
Wilson’s terms) to an individual. To illustrate the point, Giora starts from a central notion of
RT’s: the choice or selection of the context. Sperber and Wilson argue that in communication
the context is not given beforehand, but is open to choices and revisions during the process
of comprehension. There are several ways through which it is possible choose or expand
a context. For example, the listener, in order to understand a specific statement uttered
during a conversation, can include in the context the interpretation of preceding utterances
and/or the interpretation of her responses during the course of the dialogue. The relevant
point is that, according to Sperber and Wilson, relevance determines the selection of the
context; the set of assumptions that allows to get the best balance between processing effort
and cognitive effect is chosen as the appropriate context.
According to Giora [27] an idea of this type is problematic because it may lead to
situations in which the information may be relevant (in Sperber and Wilson’s terms),
although pragmatically inappropriate because it lacks coherence. To clarify the point, Giora
discusses an example proposed by Sperber and Wilson [50, p. 125]. Consider the context
composed by a), b) c) and the utterances 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) below:
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a) People who are getting married should consult a doctor about possible hereditary risks
to their children.
b) Two people with thalassemia should be warned against having children.
c) Susan has thalassemia.
1. Susan, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Bill.
2. Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan.
3. Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan, and 1976 was a great year for
French wines.
4. Susan and Bill should consult a doctor about possible hereditary risks to their children.
5. Susan and Bill should be warned against having children.
The point is to establish what utterance is the most relevant, that is to say, what has the
greater cognitive effect at the minimum processing effort. Sperber and Wilson state that (1)
and (2) are equally difficult to process because they are similar in length and require the
same context (a-c). However, (2) has greater cognitive effects (contextual implications) than
(1), while (1) has only one contextual implication. For example (4), (2) has an additional
contextual implications (5). So, Sperber and Wilson state that (2) is more relevant that (1).
Giora [27]; ([28], however, on the basis of the assumption that contexts are searched for,
states that the context needed to render (1) relevant is smaller than that needed to render
(2) relevant. In fact, in order to render (1) relevant, only two assumptions (a, c) should be
activated. Instead, to process (2), it is necessary to add (b) to the context. So, (2) is not
really more relevant than (1); (2) has more cognitive effects than (1), but it also needs more
effort processing, necessitating the expansion of the context.
The same procedure (of extending the context) may apply to render a discourse such
as (3) relevant, albeit inappropriate. Sperber and Wilson affirm that (2) is more relevant
than (3); they have the same amount of contextual implications, but (3) requires more
effort because the extra information in (3) is completely unrelated to the given context and,
consequently, has no contextual effect. However, since contexts are searched for, it is possible
to extend the context so as to render (3) relevant. For example, the speaker and hearer of
(3) should have heard that a neighbor bought them a 1976 bottle of French wine. In the
initial context (a, b, c) now there is a new assumption:
d) Our neighbor bought us a 1976 bottle of French wine.
This extended context (a, b, c, d) renders (3) as equally relevant to the context as (2) is.
While (3) requires more processing effort than (2), it also has more contextual effects. Thus,
the utterance (3) “Bill, who has thalassemia, is getting married to Susan, and 1976 was a
great year for French wines” is the more relevant in the context (a, b, c, d).
However, Giora outlines that, in spite of its relevance, (3) is an incoherent text that
the people evaluate as inappropriate: the hearer must be left puzzled as to how the two
propositions in (3) are related to each other (rather than to a context). Then, because
(3) is more relevant than (2), the information that listener evaluates as the most relevant
is (2) (even after the extension of the context). Why? Giora’s hypothesis is that such a
evaluation depends on the fact that the speaker and the listener are driven in communication
processes not only by intuitions of relevance, but also by intuitions of narrative coherence.
If relevance’s detection were the only basic principle of human communication, in fact, the
hearer (given the expanded context) should automatically consider (3) as the most pertinent
information. But, although relevant, (3) is pragmatically inappropriate. Now, important
for the scope of our argument is that the inappropriateness of (3) depends on the fact that
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it violates the listener’s intuitive expectations of coherence. Thus, the hearer’s reluctance
to consider (3) more relevant than (2) is because (3) is incoherent. The existence of such
reluctance shows that relevance is not the only principle that regulates the communicative
exchanges. An important role in this regard it also played by the principle of narrative
coherence. Now, although the examples just described are related to the intuitions of the
listener (i.e., to the interpretive processes) as previously mentioned, our idea is that in order
to give an account of the cognitive devices involved in the processing of discourse it must
analyze the processes of both comprehension and production. In the next section we will see
how the reference to executive functions as the processing systems of coherence allows us
to present a unifying one-step model of discourse processing that takes into account both
interpretative and productive processes.
6 The key role of executive functions in the building of narrative
coherence
As we have seen, coherence refers to conceptual organizational aspects of narration at the
suprasentential level. Thus, the coherence of a narrative discourse depends, at least in part,
on the speaker’s ability to maintain thematic unity [2]. When is a discourse coherent? A
dominant idea, especially among linguists, is that the coherence of a narration depends on
the linear relations between adjacent sentences, that is to say on cohesion between pairs of
consecutive sentence (e.g., [7, 10, 32, 52]). For example, consider the following text:
After the forming of the sun and the solar system, our star began its long existence
as a so-called dwarf star. In the dwarf phase of its life, the energy that the sun gives
off is generated in its core through the fusion of hydrogen into helium [8, p. 2].
In this text the sentences are connected through lexical cohesion; the lexical cohesive
relations hold among the lexical items sun, solar system, star, dwarf star and dwarf phase in
the text. Now, although the cohesive relations (the local meaning) have an important role
in the expression and recognition of coherence relations, the cohesion between consecutive
sentences seems an unnecessary and insufficient condition for the narrative coherence (see also
[26]). With reference to this a crucial distinction is that between global and local coherence.
Global coherence is the manner in which discourse is organized with respect to an overall
goal, plan, theme, or topic; it refers to the relationship between the content of a verbalization
with that of the general topic of narration. Local coherence concerns the conceptual links
between individual sentences or propositions that maintain meaning in a text or discourse
[29]. Now, while the local coherence is made possible by cohesion relationships, the same is
not true for global coherence. Consider for example the following text:
I bought a Ford. The car in which President Wilson rode down the Champs Élysées
was black. Black English has been widely discussed. The discussions between the
presidents ended last week. A week has seven days. Every day I feed my cat. Cats
have four legs. The cat is on the mat. Mat has three letters. [16, pp. 110–111].
In this text the sentences are connected through the cohesive mechanism of repetition.
However, the set of sentences, despite the abundance of cohesive ties, is not perceived as a
coherent whole. In this text the sentences do not hang together in a reasonable way; the text
lacks of global coherence. So we can argue that global coherence of a narration is independent
from cohesion, that is to say, the macrostructure of a narrative discourse cannot be formally
derived by the microstructure of the sentence.
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The idea that global coherence of a narration is independent from cohesion has received
much evidence in recently from neurolinguistics research (e.g., [15, 40, 42]). These studies
have highlighted the dissociation between the abilities that underlie sentence processing
(microstructure or microanalysis) and those that underlie narrative processing (macrostructure
or macroanalysis). Particularly relevant for our purpose are the data that come from studies
of patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI). These subjects generally have impairments of
specific prefrontal areas. Such impairments cause deficits of executive functions. Executive
functions (EFs) is an umbrella term for a wide range of cognitive and behavioral skills
whose main neural substrate is constituted by the prefrontal cortex. EFs have a key role
in regulating the equilibrium between the organism and the environment. In fact, they are
implicated in the temporal organization of goal-oriented behaviors (e.g., [4, 25, 51, 54]). EFs
allow formulating a plan, starting its execution, and maintaining attention (perseveration)
on that plane until its realization. Moreover, EFs allow the rapid shift of attention for the
adaptation to novel contexts, while they inhibit inappropriate behavioral responses to the
current situation.
Although there no precise taxonomy of executive functions (see [3, 34]), it is possible
to delineate some aspects of convergence among the neuropsychological models. There is
a general agreement that EFs are implied in processes such as planning, working memory,
inhibition, and mental flexibility, as well as in the initiation and monitoring of action [12].
Numerous studies have shown that TBI subjects generally have deficits in EFs of action
planning and monitoring. Because of such deficits, the behaviors of TBIs appear confused
and disordered; they cannot organize and complete goal-oriented behaviors because they
are not able to conceptually formulate and execute a sequence of actions [17, 47, 57]. Our
hypothesis is that the deficits of planning and monitoring in these patients are the principle
causes of their problems in narrative discourse. Our idea, in fact, is that EFs of planning
and monitoring play an important role also in building the global coherence of a narrative.
As global coherence is the manner in which discourse is organized with respect to an overall
goal, plan, theme, or topic [29], the building of narrative coherence should be conceived as
a specific case of goal- oriented behavior. From our perspective, it is possible to conceive
coherence as the way to achieve the general goal (the general topic) toward the narrative
discourse tends. Thus, the establishment of coherence implies a form of goal planning (a
conceptual formulation of the general topic) and a form of organization of the single steps
necessary to achieve that goal (organization of the single verbal expressions tied to the general
topic). Moreover, during the execution of a plan—that is, during the stage of narrative
production—it is necessary to continue estimation of the task in order to make sure that the
elements introduced are in accordance with the general topic of conversation [19].
Analyses of the narrative production of TBI patients confirm this idea. Many neur-
olinguistics studies have shown that these patients connect sentences correctly by using
cohesion ties (grammatical devices), but they are unable to construct and maintain the global
coherence of their verbal productions because they cannot relate the individual sentences to
a plan or to a more general purpose, and often introduce material that is irrelevant to the
current context in their verbal productions (e.g., [9, 29, 33, 41, 13]). Coherence appears to
be controlled by a higher-order conceptual process, whereas lexical cohesion may be driven
by more automated linguistic processes that are not disrupted after TBI. As an example of
this fact, consider the following narrative produced by a TBI subject:
I have got faults and. my biggest fault is. I do enjoy sport. it’s something that I’ve
always done. I’ve done it all my life. I’ve nothing but respect for my mother and
father and. my sister. and basically sir. I’ve only come to this conclusion this last
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two months. and. as far as I’m concerned. my sister doesn’t exist. [45, p. 305].
In this text the sentences are well formed from a strictly syntactic a point of view; the
single local sentences are not problematic. However, taken as a whole, this fragment of speech
is pragmatically inappropriate because it lacks global coherence. In fact, it is characterized
by sudden and irrelevant changes of topic. What is important to note is that, as Biddle and
colleagues [9, p. 463] pointed out, “the narrative impairment of adults and children with
TBI [. . . ] appeared to be the result of problems with planning, production and monitoring
discourse”.
Our idea is that examples of this kind, which show a dissociation of microlinguistic and
macrolinguistic cognitive functions, provide support for the distinction between microstruc-
tural and macrostructural discourse component. More specifically, confirming the idea that
coherence is processed in a top-down fashion, they support a unifying top-down model of
discourse processing according to which the global meaning of a narration constraints in a
substantial way the local meaning of the sentence.
7 Conclusions
Classical models of language functioning in cognitive science have been characterized by
bottom-up models, which are centered on sentences’ analyses. In this paper we have argued
that the priority given to sentences’ analyses undermines classical models’ capacity to explain
narrative processing because it undermines their capacity to explain a crucial property
of narration: coherence. In particular, we have suggested that coherence processing is a
top-down process in which the construction of an interpretation at the global meaning level
takes priority over local meaning analysis. Analyzing the processing systems that underlie
narrative coherence, we have shown that such a property has to be explained by focusing on
macro-analysis rather than on microanalysis. Evidence regarding narrative abilities of TBI
supports the distinction between microstructural and macrostructural discourse component
and suggests that the processing of discourse and the processing of sentence are based on
different cognitive devices. Specifically, these data show that discourse processing does not
rely on devices involved in the structural analysis of the internal constituents of the sentence.
Moreover, they support our hypothesis that coherence is processed in a top-down fashion
by cognitive systems oriented to the future (anticipation of the general theme of narration).
This general top-down account of coherence processing, according to which discourse global
meaning constrains local meaning analysis in a substantial way, provides a unifying framework
for discourse comprehension and production processes.
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